This week, we explore seabed, satellites, and sovereignty through:
- The Big Picture: What’s Under the Surface
- In Orbit: NATO Eyes the Arctic from Space
- From the Field: Developments in Maritime Presence
The Big Picture
What’s Under the Surface
This week, reports continued to emerge of Xue Long II operating in the Arctic near the U.S. extended continental shelf (ECS) off Alaska – an area Washington has extensively surveyed and submitted technical data for under UNCLOS Article 76, despite not being a treaty party. While billed as scientific research, Chinese seabed mapping is rarely only that. Under Chinese law, oceanographic data collection is inseparable from state interests, serving both academic and strategic (i.e. military) purposes.
A relevant warning comes from the South China Sea, where suspected Chinese activity damaged subsea fiber-optic cables connecting the Philippines to international networks earlier this year. Though Beijing denied involvement, the incidents followed a pattern: use of survey vessels, ostensibly for marine research, in contested waters – later coinciding with disruptions to critical infrastructure. A similar pattern has emerged with Russia in Europe. NATO nations have investigated suspected Russian involvement in the severing of undersea power and data cables in the Baltic Sea – incidents widely viewed as strategic messaging and capability demonstration.
These disruptions highlight how seabed infrastructure, though often invisible, sits squarely within the realm of modern hybrid warfare.
From a defense perspective, the Arctic ECS north of Alaska and the Bering Sea is not just about hydrocarbons and rare earths; it is a future arena for control of seabed-based infrastructure, including undersea cables that carry the world’s financial, governmental, and military data. Mapping these regions today could enable exploitation or disruption tomorrow. Combined with Russia’s sweeping ECS claim to the North Pole, such activity underscores the necessity of sustained American presence, persistent hydrographic and bathymetric surveying, and enhanced maritime domain awareness to counter any erosion of freedom of navigation and seabed security.
In Orbit
Clouds roll over the Thule Tracking Station, known as callsign POGO, at Thule Air Base, Greenland, on Aug. 11, 2022. POGO is the northernmost unit of seven worldwide tracking stations in the Satellite Control Network. The detachment’s extreme northern location allows contact with polar orbiting satellites 10-12 times per day.
NATO Eyes the Arctic from Above
At the recent NATO Defense Ministers meeting in Brussels, Arctic security received an unprecedented emphasis – not only on the surface, but in orbit. Space-based ISR, missile-warning satellites, and early-warning radars in the High North are becoming central pillars of NATO’s northern posture. U.S. homeland defense increasingly relies on a layered, cross-domain network of U.S. assets at Clear Space Force Station (Alaska), Pituffik Space Base (Greenland), and allied facilities like Andoya Space Center (Norway).
The Arctic has long been the frontline of homeland defense, especially given the polar trajectories of intercontinental and hypersonic weapons. Now, with Russia and China expanding counterspace capabilities, Arctic-based sensors are not just useful – they are critical. NATO’s NORTHLINK project aims to connect data from sensors across the Arctic with one resilient satellite network. NORTHLINK will rely on both government and commercial capabilities, an approach NATO reaffirmed in February with the endorsement of its first ever Commercial Space Strategy.
The once-hypothetical convergence of space and Arctic defense is here: continued investment in layered missile defense, resilient ISR, and Arctic-hardened space systems will be essential to deterring adversaries, safeguarding communications and navigation, and protecting the North American homeland.
From the Field
Top of the World to Down Under
With ocean making up almost half of the total Arctic region, Arctic sovereignty necessitates maritime presence. In the Arctic waters of the North Atlantic and European High North, Standing NATO Maritime Group 1 (SNMG1) provides this presence. Earlier this month, SNMG1 conducted maritime operations throughout the region, including in the Barents Sea.
On the other side of the Arctic, in the North Pacific, the U.S. marked the first commissioning of a U.S. icebreaker in 25 years. Adm. Kevin Lunday joined Senator Dan Sullivan (R-AK) in Juneau for the commissioning of the USCGC Storis. According to Lunday, the Storis’ arrival in Juneau will “add critical capacity to our polar icebreaker fleet to protect U.S. sovereignty and counter malign influence throughout the Arctic.”
Upcoming
In advance of the 2025 Anchorage Security and Defense Dialogue, we invite interested organizations to submit breakout session proposals. Please contact engagements@us.af.mil with any questions.
