Editor’s note for op-ed: Joel Kopp was the Associate Director for National & Arctic Interest Chairs at Ted Stevens Center for Arctic Security Studies, a U.S. Department of Defense Regional Center based in Alaska. The views expressed in this article only reflect his own views, not those of the TSC, U.S. Department of Defense, or the U.S. Department of State.
Over the past twelve months, I have had the opportunity to watch the Department of Defense’s newest Regional Center – the Ted Stevens Center for Arctic Security Studies – grow from a scrappy 24-month old startup with a handful of employees into an increasingly capable institution on the cusp of achieving full staffing and operational capacity. While much work remains before the Center reaches its full potential, this transformation is remarkable in light of the speed with which it is occurring, as well as the many bureaucratic and operational challenges that have arisen along the way. It is also necessary, given the growing importance of security cooperation in and for the Arctic.
I came to the Center as something of an outsider: I’m not a Center employee, and I don’t have a military background. I’m a U.S. Department of State Foreign Service Officer detailed to the Center, and my 23-year diplomatic career has mostly been served in Africa, Asia, and Washington D.C. But I also brought something of an insider’s perspective by virtue of being born and raised in Alaska.
I spent the first five years of my life in the Lake Iliamna village of Newhalen where my father was a schoolteacher. I then spent most of my formative years on the central Kenai Peninsula, and fished commercially in Bristol Bay for many summers – including two seasons as boat captain. I earned my undergraduate degree at the University of Alaska Anchorage, married an Anchorage girl, started a family, and worked in the private sector in Kenai and Valdez before getting a master’s degree at the University of Washington’s College of Aquatic and Fishery Sciences in Seattle and then joining the Foreign Service. It was this combination of Alaskan, marine, educational, and diplomatic experiences that piqued my interest in helping the Stevens Center become a success story for Alaska, for our country, and for the allied Arctic.
When I came to the Center a year ago, one of my biggest questions was what this new institution’s value proposition was for a vast Arctic region that spans the 13 times zones between Russia’s eastern and western borders. (I should note here that, despite being located on Joint Base Elmendorf-Richardson in Anchorage, the Stevens Center is not an Alaskan center but an international center with a circumpolar focus.) Having now completed my assignment, I leave with a clearer understanding of the Center’s role in helping to advance a safe, secure, and prosperous Arctic region, and offer some brief reflections on that topic below. These thoughts are my own, and do not represent the views of the U.S. Department of State, the U.S. Department of Defense, or the Ted Stevens Center for Arctic Security Studies.
Here is my bottom-line up front: Despite still being a fairly new startup, the TSC is already playing an important security cooperation role by deepening partnerships and expertise across the Arctic. In my view, an Arctic that is literally and figuratively heating up is going to require more of the Center’s work in these areas going forward, and the TSC will need to rise to meet this challenge.
A Catalyst for Partnership
My time at the Ted Stevens Center coincided with the rewriting of Arctic geopolitical history. Four months before I arrived, Finland took the unprecedented step of acceding to the NATO treaty. Eleven months later, Sweden followed suit, uniting all Arctic countries (minus Russia) under the NATO common defense umbrella for the first time. The news media may have since moved on to more urgent headlines, but history will long remember these profound, historic developments for the allied Arctic.
What did these changes mean for the Stevens Center? Had they obviated the need for the work of building security cooperation partnerships across the Arctic? The answer, as far as I have been able to tell, is rather the opposite: it made the work of the TSC even more important.
There are several reasons for this. First, accession to the NATO treaty, historic and vital as it is, has not reduced the commitment of our adversaries to exploit the Arctic region in ways that counter U.S. and allied security interests. Second, NATO does not have the Arctic as its primary focus, nor should it. Arctic nations represent a minority of NATO members, and even they have interests that extend well beyond their Arctic regions.
Third, “the Arctic” isn’t one region but a diversity of regions, each with its own particular combination of socioeconomic, geographic, climatic, natural resource, and other factors. Each also has its own unique set of Arctic stakeholders and unique relationships within the broader international Arctic region. While the allied Arctic nations share many common interests, the diversity across these regions means that each country also has its own unique and evolving perspective on what Arctic security means for them, and on the role that traditional military “hard power” plays in achieving that goal. You don’t have to be a student of international security to surmise that the Finns, who share an 830-mile border with Russia but do not have an Arctic coastline, may have a different perspective on Arctic security solutions than does an island nation with no military like Iceland, or Denmark’s Greenland with its vast size and resource wealth but very small population. The Stevens Center is positioned to serve as a convenor and repository for discussions, courses, and studies that help achieve greater mutual understanding of the security challenges and potential solutions and opportunities across these regions.
Fourth, and perhaps most importantly, stronger Arctic partnerships are needed because the region is entering uncharted territory. The reduction in Arctic sea ice we are seeing today, with the commercial opportunities and security challenges it poses, is only the most visible way the Arctic is transforming. The scale and pace of fundamental climate-driven change in the Arctic is going to increase as the region transitions from being affected by climate change to becoming a driver of climate change. As permafrost melt continues and accelerates, it is triggering the release of mind-boggling quantities of greenhouse gases that have been locked away for centuries, if not millennia.
The Arctic region is arguably changing in more fundamental ways than other global regions, and we know less than we’d like to about how that change will play out, including how it will affect security in the high north, and how it will test international, intranational, and subnational relationships there. The work of the Ted Stevens Center is helping build the infrastructure of trust, mutual understanding, and expertise across these stakeholders that will be required to cooperatively address Arctic security in this new context.
In sum: Our adversaries remain committed to countering our security interests in the Arctic, NATO is not exclusively focused on the Arctic (nor should it be); the Arctic is a diverse place with diverse actors and interests; and the Arctic is fundamentally changing in ways we don’t fully understand. Finland’s and Sweden’s accession to NATO, as historic and welcome as it was, did not change any of these factors. The challenge now is to ensure that uniting the allied Arctic under NATO yields dividends in and for the Arctic. The creation of the Stevens Center in 2021 was a serendipitous development seemingly ready-made to meet this moment in history and contribute to that important work.
The good news is that there appears to be a broad welcome for this work, despite (and possibly because of) the trans-Arctic diversity mentioned above. A foundational principle in both diplomacy and security is that presence matters, which is perhaps why interest in greater Arctic engagement with and by the United States seems to be a common thread across the north. Joint U.S. and allied presence and projection of hard power military capabilities is often welcomed because it can prevent kinetic conflict from occurring, which is foundational to Arctic security. But the soft power presence of the Ted Stevens Center, as with the DoD’s five other Regional Centers, provides a vital complement to that hard power role, and thus enjoys a broad welcome across the Arctic as well.
The Regional Centers’ soft power role is vital because the drivers of conflict and insecurity can often be recognized, studied, discussed, and prevented or mitigated before they metastasize into conflict. In the Arctic as elsewhere, regional security is a function not only of military defense but also of a spectrum of human security issues like food security, energy security, and infrastructure security, among others. In the Arctic, nearly all these human security issues are being, or will be, fundamentally altered by the climate-driven changes. No one understands that better than those who live in the Arctic, particularly the indigenous peoples who have called the Arctic home for millennia, which is why the Stevens Center prioritizes the inclusion of northern and indigenous leaders in its programs.
The Stevens Center is convening and participating in discussions on these human security issues, and their nexus to Arctic security, in places that have not often been the focus of such discussions, such as Utqiagvik, Yellowknife, Iqaluit, and Nuuk. Thanks to the work of the Stevens Center, a broader set of stakeholders in communities like these will be more connected to Arctic security discussions and more participatory in identifying potential solutions. A more secure Arctic requires this hard work of building relationships, expertise, and mutual understanding, and that work is the mission of the Ted Stevens Center.
A Catalyst for Expertise
The School of Arctic and Climate Security Studies is at the core of the Ted Stevens Center’s mission, and executive education is the Center’s top priority. Raising the level of Arctic literacy and expertise among U.S. and allied military and civilian personnel is a vital condition for achieving and maintaining a secure Arctic. The United States has been an Arctic nation since it purchased Alaska more than 150 years ago, but the nation’s warfighting has primarily occurred in warmer climates. Already with nearly 2,000 alumni of its courses on topics like Arctic domain awareness, indigenous peoples, maritime law, and operations, the Stevens Center is advancing the Arctic expertise and proficiency that the U.S. and allied community of Arctic practitioners needs to lead and operate with confidence in the region. This in turn helps protect our capacity to continue to project presence and power there, even as the operating environment continues to change.
Born and raised in Alaska, I thought I had a solid grasp of the fundamentals of Arctic security. Taking a few of these courses myself quickly revealed how wrong I was. It’s not a region that lends itself to intuitive answers or easy solutions. More students taking these courses are coming to the same conclusion, and demand remains high, with the number and topics of the courses on offer expected to expand significantly in the coming years.
The Stevens Center is building a Research and Analysis Division that will similarly advance U.S. and allied understanding on important issues related to the security of the Arctic region, and provide a venue for discussions and publications on these topics. The division is now publishing the second volume of its Journal of Arctic and Climate and Security Studies, with volumes three and four in the works. Because the School of Arctic and Climate Security Studies and the Research and Analysis Division engage our international allies and partners, their work supports not only the professionalization of Arctic practitioners but also contributes to the Center’s partnership catalyzing role.
The Look Ahead: Rising to the Challenge
The mission of security cooperation across the Arctic is too big a job for one institution, especially one as new as the Stevens Center. Other U.S. and allied institutions of defense and diplomacy are also working on different elements of this challenge, but the Stevens Center’s circumpolar view, DoD backing, and Regional Center-informed approaches make it a unique and potentially powerful player in this sector.
One way the Center is leveraging its strengths is through building new security relationship infrastructure, such as its National and Arctic Interest Chairs program, that leverages partnerships and subject matter expertise to do more than the Center could do with its own staff. As allied nations and partner institutions establish Chairs at the Center, they will serve as liaisons between the Center and their home countries and institutions, adding to the value and work of both.
Given the scale and complexity of the Arctic security challenge, it may be that one of the most important measures of success for the Center, as well as for its component education, research, and engagement divisions, will be less about what they can do themselves to advance Arctic security, and more about how they can leverage, catalyze, and coordinate the capabilities and expertise of our domestic and allied partners to advance Arctic security together. In other words, to demonstrate that this is not only a Center by and for the DoD, but also a Center by and for the Arctic, and one whose success depends in good measure on the contributions we all can make. As a diplomat, I am grateful that the Stevens Center views the Department of State and its embassies across the Arctic as invaluable partners in this enterprise, and seeks to work with them closely in its international programs and activities.
Given the potential opportunities and needs in the Arctic, high expectations are already being placed on the Ted Stevens Center and its work. But it’s important to remember that this institution is still in its early days, and still awaiting full operational capacity certification. The Center is only nearing the end of its beginning, in other words. Only the preface of the Stevens Center story has been written, with the first chapters still forthcoming. I finish my assignment here confident that this institution will rise to the challenge of taking its rightful place among – and will make lasting, substantial contributions within – the Arctic security cooperation community. There is much riding on these efforts, but if they can help to prevent a rapidly changing Arctic from eroding the security and rules-based order that the Arctic has long enjoyed, it will be worth it.
A Final Word
Finland and Sweden joining NATO, the creation of new Arctic-focused institutions such as the Ted Stevens Center, fundamental climate-driven changes, and other factors are making this an historic time to be living in or working on the Arctic. Against this backdrop, I’ve been privileged to be part of a smaller historic development: the creation of a U.S. Foreign Service Officer position in Alaska. My knowledge of U.S. State Department history is not sufficiently encyclopedic to be able to claim that there has never been a U.S. diplomat posted to Alaska before, but I am not aware of such a position having existed. What is certain is that I was lucky enough to be the first resident diplomat in Alaska, if not ever, then at least in service to the Ted Stevens Center and its vitally important Arctic security mission. As a diplomat, and as an Alaskan, I will always be grateful for that.